October 9, 2026
On August 7, 2026, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye signed the “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement.” In fact—unless the signatory states chose to keep the text secret—what was signed was merely a joint statement.
My initial reaction to the news of this so-called “agreement” included the following questions:
“Against whom is this agreement? Iran? Today, Saudi Arabia and Iran are at war. Are we going to be at war with Tehran the next time they fire a missile toward Saudi Arabia? Aren’t Israel and Saudi Arabia informal allies in the war against Iran? Are we integrating ourselves into their de facto alliance, one the US administration seeks to formalize by drawing Riyadh into the Abraham Accords? Are we going to end our toned-down anti-Israel rhetoric? What about the possibility of an India-Pakistan conflict? How does this agreement harmonize with our NATO commitments? What compelled Ankara to sign this agreement? What are we getting from this “deal”? If the defense/military dimension of the agreement is nothing but words, what about the political commitments? Doesn’t Türkiye need to follow an independent foreign policy in today’s turbulent world, particularly in the Middle East?”[i]
On October 5, the “Strategic Political and Defense Committee of the Mecca Alliance for Defense, held an emergency meeting in Riyadh. The following is from their joint statement:
“The Parties also condemned in the strongest terms the attempted targeting of Mecca and Medina…
“The Committee decided to move immediately to the practical implementation of the collective defense commitments and to take the necessary measures to provide the agreed military forces and capabilities and ensure their rapid deployment in the Kingdom, in accordance with the approved arrangements and the national legislation of the Parties, thereby enhancing readiness, military integration, and the collective capacity to confront and counter threats.”[ii]
This escalation has several dimensions:
Under the Turkish Constitution, international treaties must be submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) for debate and formal ratification. This is a cornerstone of the separation of powers and democratic oversight. Becoming a party to an arrangement that implies collective defense commitments—analogous to NATO’s Article 5—requires parliamentary approval. Furthermore, the deployment of the Turkish Armed Forces abroad requires prior parliamentary authorization. At present, no treaty, binding agreement, or executive motion requesting authorization for troop deployment has been submitted to the National Assembly.
Elaborate arguments are hardly needed to show that Türkiye must avoid becoming a party to the conflict in Yemen. The war in Yemen is an internal conflict compounded by external regional intervention.
Therefore, the primary responsibility for ending this war rests with the Arab League member states. If the holy cities of Mecca and Medina face security threats, then the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) should take a position.
In short, entering binding commitments or undertaking military deployments under this joint statement would be one of the Turkish Republic’s most serious foreign and security policy mistakes. Temporary economic or financial incentives to draw Türkiye into the Yemeni quagmire cannot outweigh the long-term strategic consequences of such an ill-advised move. Pakistan has now confirmed that it has troops stationed in Saudi Arabia. That is their choice. But it cannot be ours.[iii]
Türkiye, already facing challenges in its immediate neighborhood, including the Black Sea, must not allow itself to be dragged into this faraway conflict. Unfortunately, our foreign and security policy challenges are not the only ones. On the home front, the erosion of democratic norms, the government’s ongoing war against opposition municipalities, economic decline, and the investment fund scandal remain major concerns. Embarking on uncalculated foreign military adventures would only aggravate these problems and deepen our polarization.
Recent developments regarding the “Mecca Alliance” evoke historical memories. Older generations recall the sad “Yemen türküsü” (Song of Yemen), which mourns the thousands of Ottoman soldiers sent to Yemen during the First World War who never returned.
If and when a government motion regarding the Mecca Alliance comes before the parliament, many will also remember March 1, 2003, when the Turkish Parliament fulfilled its constitutional duty by rejecting a motion that would have allowed foreign forces to use Turkish territory to invade Iraq. Though it upset the Bush administration, that decision earned us global respect.
Türkiye’s highest interests lie in returning to democracy, constitutional governance, diplomatic prudence, an independent foreign policy, and categorically rejecting attempts to interfere in our affairs—not in strategic overreach on distant battlefields.
[i] https://diplomaticopinion.com/2026/08/08/turkiye-at-an-inflection-point-3/#more-2992
[ii] https://mofa.gov.pk/press-releases/joint-statementemergency-meeting-of-the-strategic-political-and-defense-committee-of-the-makkah-alliance-for-defense-riyadh-5-october-2026
[iii] https://edition.cnn.com/2026/10/07/middleeast/houthis-attack-saudi-airports-latam-intl
