Two Wars

November 16, 2026

Last week, in remarks to the press, Secretary Rubio, while underlining that behind all the destabilizing activities in the Middle East is the Iranian regime and reasserting that the US military is capable and ready at any moment to launch destructive attacks on Iran, also said that Tehran now has less funding for all its malign and nefarious activities and that the blockade and the economic sanctions imposed are so devastating that, right now, there is no need for major combat operations. He rejected the suggestion that this is a stalemate and refrained from speculating about any thresholds for renewed attacks on Iran.[i]

President Trump has also said that no deal is needed with Iran.

Both remarks showed that, with growing dissatisfaction about the rising cost of living and the war in Iran, as revealed by the midterm elections, the Trump administration needs time to think about “what went wrong?”

Rubio also said, “The President takes a lot of input from people in his administration.  He takes input and ideas from our partners and our allies around the world, to outside experts, to the people he talks to.  But in the end, the decision is the President.  And once the President chooses a direction, it’s our job in this administration to execute on the President’s direction.”

Whether this was about clearing “Trump’s Top Three” of prime responsibility for major decisions in US foreign and security policy, including Iran, or reaffirming Trump’s supremacy remains to be seen. His pulling Vice President Vance back from potential peace talks with Iran points toward the latter. What is clear is that discord between Trump and his top team members has begun earlier than expected.

It is not only the majority of Americans who are unhappy with the war in Iran. If a vote were held at the UN, it would show that, given the conflict’s negative impact on energy supplies, all countries prefer a quick end to the war.

Unfortunately, this is unlikely. First, the Iranian regime sees the midterm election results as a win against the Trump administration. Second, Iranians are skilled negotiators with an ability to prolong talks, and likely believe they are in a better position to push further with their demands regarding anti-Iran sanctions, the release of their frozen assets, and their nuclear program, particularly what happens with their enriched uranium.

In early March, President Trump said he thought the war he launched on the last day of February would be over in “four to five weeks.” In April, “Over the next two to three weeks, we’re going to bring them back to the Stone Ages, where they belong,” he said. On October 1, in a social media post, he said, “I stated, numerous times, that it would take 4-6 weeks to get rid of THE IRAN NUCLEAR THREAT, and I did it in one night! The rest of the time is just to make sure it stays that way.”

It has been seven months since the US and Israel launched their attack on Iran, and the state of Iran’s nuclear program remains unclear. There is no doubt the program took a major blow, but whether the threat has been completely eliminated remains uncertain. In other words, prolonged negotiations would put pressure on the Trump administration to act, making some escalation likely.

Rubio also commented on Europe’s role in the trilateral negotiation between the US, Russia, and Ukraine in Abu Dhabi. He said:

“They’re with us; they’re right alongside us… And as our negotiators have made clear, we think the trilateral should eventually include our European partners at the table as well, because they are a part of solving this problem for the long term… And I think this trilateral eventually will be expanded to include them in order to arrive at a final agreement here.”

In March 2025, he was less forthcoming about European presence at the table. He said that ultimately, when negotiations reach a point, i.e., when “real negotiations” begin, Europeans will have to be involved because they also have sanctions on Putin and Russia.

Perhaps, after the midterms, Washington preferred to expand the European countries’ role beyond buying US arms for Ukraine and give them a seat at the table to rebalance its own involvement in the conflict.

Moscow, however, struck a different tone: Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov rejected a ceasefire, saying it was an attempt to “buy time” for the Kyiv regime and use it to rebuild its military. He also brushed off the European officials’ presence in Abu Dhabi: “Well, they flew to Abu Dhabi. Let them sit there in the hotel.” [ii]

Nonetheless, following talks with Putin, Witkoff and Kushner said both sides have now agreed to expand the next round of negotiations to include European partners and this will allow addressing the broader postwar European security arrangements alongside the territorial issues between Ukraine and Russia. And Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov said, “We hope that representatives of European countries will also support efforts to agree on the parameters of a new, long-term architecture of indivisible security and peace, a process we are ready to begin immediately, in tandem with our American counterparts.”[iii]

Last Friday, after the informal meeting of Heads of State and Government, President António Costa said that the Leaders agreed that the European Team for the negotiations on peace in Ukraine consists of the European Union institutions and the E5 (France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the UK) of the Coalition of the Willing.[iv]

Some view the US agreement to discuss Europe’s “future security architecture” with Moscow as an early Russian win. This may explain why Chancellor Merz said, also on Friday, “… there is no need to talk about European security architecture. We have that already.” Do all the E5 share the same opinion? Do all other EU leaders agree with him, or do some hold a more nuanced view on dialogue with Russia? Is Europe united on Ukraine? Not exactly. European countries are united in their desire to end the war but differ on the path forward.

In late October, Finland’s President Alexander Stubb and Norway’s Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre held a joint phone call with President Putin. Last week, Chancellor Merz tied the EU budget to collective financial support for Ukraine, threatening cuts to cohesion funding. This prompted a reaction from some EU member states. Some Western observers keep suggesting that European countries should use Russia’s frozen assets to finance military support to Ukraine. If put in practice, this will be the straw that breaks the camel’s back and unite Russians behind Putin.

Unfortunately, wars happen. As the devastation takes its toll, or once the picture on the battlefield becomes clear, peace talks begin. European leaders have two options: start bilateral contacts with Moscow to pave the way for a broader Europe-Russia dialogue or remain on the sidelines. The path to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 might offer clues for dialogue.

The Helsinki summit was a turning point in the Cold War, three decades of geopolitical, ideological, and economic rivalry between the US and the USSR and their allies. During those decades, the two powers backed opposing sides in regional and civil conflicts around the world, including in Korea and Vietnam, but did not engage in direct military combat. For the past five years, Europe has been engaged in a real war, not just a cold one. Neither this war nor a new Cold War will serve anyone’s interests. Updating the Helsinki Accords would be a better option but perhaps a tougher task than in 1975. The interested parties also need to decide whether the “expanded Abu Dhabi talks” are the right format to accomplish that.

On November 10, the day the trilateral Abu Dhabi talks began, the European Council issued a statement after the earlier meeting there between the EU, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, Ukraine, the US, and NATO. It said:

“Discussions took place collaboratively between the European partners, Ukraine and United States, reflecting their shared objectives, ongoing consultations, and commitment to Euro-Atlantic security. Participants emphasized that any future arrangements must respect sovereignty, territorial integrity, independent decision-making, and provide credible security guarantees for Ukraine. Participants emphasized that any future arrangements must respect sovereignty, territorial integrity, independent decision-making, and provide credible security guarantees for Ukraine.” (emphasis added)

The question is how much the participants agreed on the content of the “future arrangements” and whether European representatives were consulted on the idea of Ukraine ceding Donbas for Nato membership.

Despite some encouraging remarks by participants, Moscow’s negotiating position appears to remain based on the two draft documents handed to the West in mid-December 2021 and rejected.[v]

In brief, one has to wait and see the Kremlin’s response to the latest developments. Despite optimistic assessments of the talks, neither a quick end to the war nor a breakthrough in that direction appears in sight yet. Redefining the European security structure will take time. What is clear for now is that Russia is more clear-eyed about the future than the West, in disarray.


[i] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesman/2026/11/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-remarks-to-the-press-23

[ii] https://mid.ru/en/press_service/video/view/2162090/

[iii] http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/81252

[iv] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/11/13/remarks-by-president-antonio-costa-at-the-press-conference-following-the-informal-meeting-of-heads-of-state-or-government

[v] https://diplomaticopinion.com/2022/01/03/russia-proposes-a-new-security-architecture-in-europe-and-beyond/

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