On May 19, in a government statement in the German Bundestag, Chancellor Scholz said, “We all share the same goal: Russia must not win this war. Ukraine must survive.” Putin first has to realize that he cannot break Ukraine’s defense before he would be willing to negotiate seriously about peace, he continued. “Emmanuel Macron is right to point out that the entry process is not a question of a few months or even years,” the Federal Chancellor added.
Last week, in an article titled, “The U.S. Races to Arm Ukraine with Heavier, More Advanced Weaponry” the New York Times provided the reader with extensive information about the Western arms supplies to Ukraine.[i] It mentioned the Russian warning that Western deliveries of the “most sensitive” weapons systems to Ukraine could bring “unpredictable consequences”. It drew attention to concerns among NATO allies regarding the kinds of military equipment sent to Ukraine. Earlier in the week, German Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck had warned NATO allies that deliveries of modern tanks from Western producers could prompt Russia to extend its war to Western countries.
A country’s foreign policy is shaped by its identity, sense of belonging, world outlook, and geographic location. This last one is a constant, others are subject to evolution, change, and definition/redefinition within the limits of reason. The task of governments is to merge these with national power into policies designed to maximize national interest. Domestic politics and foreign policy are intimately linked. Sometimes governments and political leaders seize on opportunities offered by international developments. They launch initiatives to “promote national interests”, “reinforce the rules-based international order”, and “ensure respect for international law”. However, such initiatives almost always have a domestic politics dimension. Sometimes they pay off, sometimes they fail.
On April 5, 2022, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed that assertions of “war crimes” are a pretext to torpedo the ongoing negotiations at a time when some light, however dim, has appeared at the end of the tunnel. Then, elaborating on the talks held in Istanbul on March 29, 2022, he said:
“For the first time ever, the Ukrainian side has put on paper that it is prepared to declare Ukraine a neutral, non-aligned, and non-nuclear state, and to refuse to deploy weapons from foreign states on its territory or to conduct exercises on its territory with the participation of foreign military personnel, unless they are approved by all guarantors of the future treaty, including the Russian Federation. The security guarantees envisaged by the treaty are a step toward everyone realizing that the negotiations need to completely rule out NATO’s eastward expansion, primarily to Ukraine, and to ensure indivisible security in Europe.”
The following was my summing-up of the Ukraine conflict seven years ago:
“News from Ukraine and Ukraine-related developments are not encouraging. The Minsk cease-fire remains fragile. Political and economic difficulties facing Ukraine show no sign of abating. The Government does not appear strong and determined enough. There has been no progress on the level of autonomy to be recognized to the separatist regions. The conflict between “federalization” and “decentralization” continues. Ukraine troops are now being trained by American officers. Russia’s naval deployments and air activity are becoming increasingly reminiscent of the Cold War. NATO is holding joint exercises in Poland, Lithuania, the US in Georgia. The Treaty on Alliance and Integration between Russia and South Ossetia has been submitted to the State Duma for ratification. The flow of immigrants and asylum seekers from Ukraine into EU countries is on the rise… The West continues to see Mr. Putin as an unpredictable leader determined not to allow Ukraine to chart its future. He says that he wants as close interaction as possible with the US, based on equal rights and mutual respect of interests and positions of each other. Both the West and Russia seemingly desire to put the Ukraine conflict behind and move forward but words and deeds do not match.” [i]
Western countries are experiencing a shock because it is for the first time since the end of the Second World War that the continent is witnessing a major armed conflict, the only exception being the break-up of Yugoslavia and the NATO airstrikes in March 1999, the first military operation against a European country in the history of the Alliance. Since 1945, wars were fought elsewhere, in Korea, Algeria, Vietnam, and in recent decades mostly in the broad Middle East. Europe’s immediate problem was to prevent Middle East refugees, escaping the tragic consequences of Western military interventions, from reaching its shores. Thus, post-war stability had led many to believe that war had become obsolete in Europe. Not anymore.
Merriam-Webster defines “brinkmanship” as, “the art or practice of pushing a dangerous situation or confrontation to the limit of safety especially to force a desired outcome”, and “diplomacy” as “the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations”. However, I am inclined to see the former not as an art, but as a gambling game at the end of which, more often than not, there are no winners.
Now, with loss of life, devastation, displacement within Ukraine and into neighboring countries, “brinkmanship” in the Ukraine crisis has already gone beyond the limit of safety. So, it is time for diplomacy.
During the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western countries failed to help Moscow chart a new path. Some former members of the Warsaw Pact, which had remained forcibly under communist regimes since the end of the Second World War, others under Soviet occupation and yearning for independence, crossed over to the “other side” in exercising what was their indisputable right under international law. There were no written commitments of the kind Russia is demanding now regarding NATO expansion, but one may say in all fairness that at least an understanding was given. Ukraine’s leaders should have been in a better position than those in the West to know that their joining NATO was a real red line for Moscow. They could have waited longer to fulfill their aspiration to join the EU, for the post-Cold War European security architecture to evolve, Russia to digest the loss of an empire and waves of NATO expansion.
The Turkish Government has decided to close the Turkish Straits to all warships as a result of Russia’s military offensive against Ukraine. So, I thought that an updated version of a post I had written two years ago could be timely.
Two years ago, I was trying to draw attention to the risks of the politically, financially, and environmentally extravagant, and totally unnecessary “Canal Istanbul” project. With the decline of the Turkish economy, the project is unfortunately not dead yet, but it has moved way down on the Government’s agenda. Today, not only Turkey’s but the world’s attention is focused on the Russian offensive against Ukraine. Thus, the Montreux Convention has once again become a topic of interest. And this may prove the last nail in the coffin for the Canal Istanbul project.
In my last post, I said that President Putin would probably resist ordering a full-scale invasion of Ukraine because a bloody conflict will zero out his theory about the Russians and Ukrainians being one people. I proved wrong. It seems that the risks of leaving lasting scars on the Ukrainian psyche, the potential loss of life, and suffering did not stop him. Thus, despite repeated denials of any intention to take military action, President Putin ordered a premeditated full-scale invasion of Ukraine in defiance of international law, the UN Charter, and Russia’s own definition of the so-called rules-based international order. In the long term, even the people of Russia may see this invasion, not as a glorious conquest but as a sad chapter of Russian history.