November 13, 2024
The stunning comeback of Mr. Trump as President-elect has triggered speculation about the future of US foreign policy, particularly regarding the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. The latter’s past decade might offer some clues into the future.
Okumaya devam etOctober 3, 2024
Ankara’s foreign policy of the past fifteen years is a story of extreme rhetoric, defiance, and inconsistencies. Every country can make reasonable adjustments to its foreign policy. But if U-turns become a pattern, this signals a lack of long-term foresight. A sound foreign policy follows a steady course like a big ship, it does not constantly change direction like a runabout.
Okumaya devam etSeptember 2, 2024
Hafez al-Assad was the 18th president of Syria from 1971 until he died in 2000. He was the number one regional enemy of Türkiye. Starting in the mid-1980s, Syria provided the PKK and its leader Ocalan with safe havens from where they launched terrorist attacks against Türkiye across the 910-kilometer border. President Assad, despite irrefutable evidence provided by Ankara over the years, constantly denied support. Türkiye’s patience finally ran out. In the fall of 1988, the Turkish land forces commander delivered an ultimatum on the border saying that either Syria deported Ocalan or the Turkish army would move in. Hafez al-Assad complied. On October 20, 1988, Türkiye and Syria signed the Adana Agreement which was essentially a commitment by Damascus to end its support to terrorism.
Okumaya devam etMay 9, 2016
“Cessation of Hostilities in Syria”, worked out between Russia and the US and approved by the UNSC through Resolution 2268, entered into force on February 27, 2016. For two months, despite violations, it seemed to hold inspiring cautious optimism. However, two major challenges remained.
The first was the launching of not just talks but “meaningful talks” between the regime and the opposition. On March 21, Reuters reported that U.N. envoy Staffan de Mistura described Syria’s political transition as “the mother of all issues” in response to regime’s representative Bashar Ja’afari who said that Assad’s future had “nothing to do” with the negotiations.
The second was how to deal with terrorist organizations not only as a short-term battlefield issue but also a long-term problem for Syria and beyond. Under the terms of the “Cessation of Hostilities in Syria”, Russia and the US were expected to delineate, with other members of the ISSG’s Ceasefire Task Force, the territory held by “Daesh, Jabhat al-Nusra” and other terrorist organizations designated by the UN Security Council” which were excluded from the cessation of hostilities. It was obvious that in view of conflicting interests this would be easier said than done. Okumaya devam et
Diplomatik Yorum - Ali Tuygan 